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WISCONSIN'S
MODIFIED, MODIFIED

COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE L A :
JohnJ. Kircher
isconsin has a long and storied history
of comparative negligence law. It dates
back to 1931 when the statute creating
the rule was first enacted. 1 Prior to 1995,
only one substantive change was made in
the statute. In 1971 the words "greater
than" were substituted for "as great as" so

ery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering.

that, in its totality, section 895.045 of the
Wisconsin Statutes provided:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or the
person's legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death

1995 Wisconsin Act 17, the Wisconsin
Legislature added language to the statute
which makes it relatively clear that the
drafters set out to accomplish two things:
1) to codify a previous court interpretation
of the rule3; and 2) to partially eliminate
the doctrine of joint and severalliability. 4
This article examines those two provisions; attempts to discern legislative in-

or in injury to person or property, if such
negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recov-

1995 marks the second major substantive change in Wisconsin's comparative
negligence statute. Through section 1 of

How Wisconsin courts will interpret recent, dramatic changes in
comparative negligence law will depend upon how the courts
interpret the legislative product. Here's one person's educated
guess on what that interpretation might entail.

tent; and briefly explores possible repercussions of those changes.
At the outset note should be taken of
basic rules of statutory construction followed by Wisconsin courts. Construction
of a statute is a question of law, with no
deference being given to lower court interpretations.5 The purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative
intent. 6 When determining legislative intent, the court first examines the language
of the statute itself and will resort to extrinsic aids only if the language is ambiguous.7

Reiter codification
The first substantive change8 to section
895.045 of the Wisconsin Statutes, effected by section 1 of 1995 Wisconsin Act
17, appears to be an attempt to codify a

principle enunciated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Reiter v. Dyken.9 The
importance of Reiter is put in better context by understanding that it followed the
court's decision in May v. Skelley Oil Co. 10
In May the court intimated that it was
poised, given the appropriate case, to
change its construction of the comparative
negligence statute so that, to determine
liability, the plaintiff' s negligence would
be measured against the combined negligence of all defendants. Many thought that
Reiter would be that appropriate case.
However, in Reiter the court restated the
principle that, to determine liability, a
plaintiff's causal negligence is to be examined separately in relation to the causal
negligence of each defendant.

The 1995 Act adds a new sentence to
the statute, providing that the plaintiff's
negligence "shall be measured separately
against the negligence of each person
found to be causally negligent." 1 In light
of the 1995 amendment, it should be
understood that Reiter was not concerned
with how negligence is "measured." The

"measuring" or comparison of the par-

ties' negligence is carried out by the trier

of fact- in most cases a lay jury. The jury

is inVtructcd, for example:
"You will determine how much and to
what extent each party is to blame for the
injuries to the plaintiff and whether the
conduct of one made a largcr 1 equal or
smaller contribution than the other. You
will fix the percentage attributable to
each party in proportion to the fault that
he contributed to cause the plaintiff's
injurics." 12
Prior to its most recent amendment,
section 895.045 expressed the principle
that a plaintiff would be barred from
recovery only if her negligence was found
to be greater than that of the person
against whom recovery is sought. Reiter,
and presumably the amending language,
is concerned with what a court does with
the percentages after they are "measured"
by the trier of fact. In determining liability under section 895.045, the plaintiff's
negligence will be considered separately
against that of each individual defendant,
and not against the defendants' aggregate negligence. This determines the responsibility of each defendant to the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff found to be 40
percent causally negligent could notrecover from any of three defendants each
found to be 20 percent at fault, even
though their combined negligence totals
60 percent. That, Reiter decided, had
been and would continue to be the proper
interpretation. That is presumably what
the 1995 amendment means when it requires that the plaintiff's negligence "shall
be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent."
There is another possible legislative
intent, albeit hard to believe and possibly
inconsistent with the additional amending language discussed in the next section of this article. The language could be
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interpreted to mean that, in multiple defendant cases, there will be separate divisions of 100 percent between the plaintiff
and each defendant. At best, that interpretation is strained and a court must
avoid a statutory interpretation that produces an absurd or unreasonable rcsult. 13
The amendment's use of the word
"measured" could create a problem. The
sentence could be interpreted to be nothing more than a codification of other
Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretations
of the comparative negligence statute.
Under that precedent, triers of fact are to
assign separate percentages of negligence
to each person found to be causally negligent.14
The intent to codify Reiter would have
been more clear if the Legislature had
chosen language providing, for example,
that "in determining liability to the plaintiff, the negligence percentages of the
persons against whom recovery is sought
shall not be combined." Nevertheless,
the new language added by the Legislature should foreclose further action by
the supreme court on the Reiter issue
because there is no other reasonable interpretation of that language.
Some might question why, in light of
Reiter, any new language was necessary.
The Legislature may have read the Reiter
decision to mean that the court simply
was unwilling to adopt a rule combining
the negligence of defendants to determine liability to the plaintiff, and not to
mean that the court thought it lacked the
power to do so. There would be good
reason for such a view of the case. The
Reiter majority stated:
"Thus the question presented is not
whether the court has the power to extend
the defense of contributory negligence
beyond the limitation placed upon it by
the legislature, but whether it may limit
the application of that doctrine further
than the legislature has required.
"We believe it can." 15

Joint and several liability

More interesting than the Reiter issue is
the concluding language of section 1 of
the Act, which adds two additional sentences to the statute:
"The liability of each person found to
be causally negligent whose percentage
of causal negligence is less than 51% is
limited to the percentage of the total
causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and
severally liable for the damages alIowed."16

This neZ language is concerned with
joint and several liability, leaving intact a
basic princiSle of the unamended Wisconsin comparative negligence rule - a
plaintiff whose negligence is "greater
than" that of an individual defendant will
not be able to recover damages from that
defendant. For example, let us assume a
situation in which a plaintiff's total damages are found to be $100,000, and in
which percentages of causal negligence
are determined to be as follows:
p
D1
D2
D3
30
30
30
10
No legislative intent should be inferred that would allow the plaintiff to
recover from anyone other than Dl and
D2. The unamended portion of the statXte still provides that if the plaintiff's
negligence is "greater than" the negligence of a defendant, the plaintiff will be
barred from recovery against that person.
Thus no recovery from D3 should be
possible. As to the plaintiff's recovery
from D1 and D2, the total damages of
$100,000 first would be reduced by 30
percent to the sum of $70,000 because of
the plaintiff's fault. The unamended language of what is now section 895.045(1)
calls for that reduction by continuing to
provide that "any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the
person recovering."
After the reduction reflecting the
plaintiff's portion of causal fault, the
amendment would appear to require that
3/6 or 1/2 of the $70,000 would be recoverable from Dl and a like amount
from D2. The Legislature appears to want
each of the two defendants in this situation to be severally liable to the plaintiff
for $35,000, and nothing more. Under
the "old" rule each of the two defendants
would be jointly and severally liable to
the plaintiff for $70,000. 17 Now, with
several liability under the new rule, the
insolvency of a liable defendant would
result in an incomplete recovery for the
plaintiff.
The only other plausible interpretations of the "limited to the percentage of
the total causal negligence attributed to
that person" language would be that D 1
and D2 each would be liable to the plaintiff for either 30 percent of the total
damages (that is, 30% X $100,000 =
$30,000) or 30 percent of the total damages after the reduction in proportion to
the plaintiff's fault (30% X $70,000 =
$21,000). However, either interpretation
would mean a second reduction of the
plaintiff's damages. although the
unamended language refers to only one
WISCONSIN LAWYEf\

form of reductio n. Again, a court must
avoid a statutory interpretation that produces an absurd or unreasonable result.' 8
Consider if the plaintiff's total damages in the previous example remained
the same and the percentages of causal
negligence were changed to the following:
p
D1
D2
D3
10
20
60
10
In this example, the amendment would
significa ntly change a portion of Wisconsin comparative negligence law.
Again, however, the change would affect
only rules of joint and several liability.
Each of the three defendants no longer
would be jointly and severally liable to
the plaintiff for total damages, reduced
by the plaintiff's 10 percent (that is,
$90,000). As with the previous illustration D1 and D3 would be severally liable
only for their shares of the recoverable
damages (2/9 or $20,000 and 1/9 or
$10,000, respectively). However, with
respect to D2, who has "51% or more" of
the causal negligence, the amendment
would appear to make her jointly and
severally liable with the others for all of
the plaintiff's recoverable damages. Thus,
the plaintiff could recover the entire
$90,000 from D2.
No portion of the amending language
speaks to the issue of the contribution
rights of parties o nce the plaintiff has
been made whole. It is generally accepted that fo r a right of contribution to
exist, a party needs: 1) to share common
liability to the plaintiff with others, and 2)
to have paid mo re than her fair share of
the plaintiff's damages.19 With the addition of the new language it would appear
that, with one exception to be noted subsequently, only one who is "51% or more"
causally negligent will be in a position to
have paid more than her fair share of the
recoverable damages. As noted in the last
example above, o nly D2 could be forced
to pay the plaintiff the total amount of the
plaintiff's recoverable damages. In fact,
basic math portends that in no case could
there ever be more than one party who is
"1% or more" causa II y negligent.20 Thus,
using the figures supplied above, if D2
paid the plaintiff all the recoverable damages of $90,000, D2 would have contribution rights against Dl and D3 for their
fair shares of the $90,000 (2/9 or $20,000
and 1/9 or $10,000, respectively). Of
course, the foregoing assumes that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court will determine that with Dl and D3 being only
severally liable and D2 being jointly and
severally liable, the three share "common liability" to the plaintiff.
February 1996

The subjects of comparative negligence and contribution in Wisconsin naturally lead to the topic of releases, particularly the famousPierringer release. 2 ' The
value of the Pierringer release lies in the
fact that a settling defendant can make
her peace with the plaintiff without worry
about a later contribution claim by a
nonsettlor. The amendments should have
little impact upo n the use of these releases. Settlors will not be aware, until
after the trial, of whether their liability to
the plaintiff was o nly several or joint and
several. Pretrial settlement could lead to
a situation in which the settlor paid more
than her fair share of a plaintiff's recoverable damages, even though the settlor
is subsequently found less than 51 percent causally negligent. Normal rules of
contribution would apply to such a situation. However, the Legislature has imposed a rather short one-year statute of
limitations applicable to pretrial settlement contribution claims.22

Conclusion

The foregoing have merely been one
person's educated guesses as to how
Wisconsin courts will interpret these dramatic changes in comparative negligence
law. What is important is how Wisconsin
courts will interpret the legislative product. No one can predict with certainty
how Wisconsin courts will integrate these
changes into the comparative negligence
jurisprudence. One should remember the
words of Justice Frankfurter that "[t)he
intrinsic difficulties of language and the
emergence, after enactment, of situations
not anticipated by even the most gifted
legislative imagination reveal the doubts
and ambiguities in statutes that so often
compel judicial construction."23
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